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Abstract— Market abuse has attracted much attention from 
financial regulators around the world but it is difficult to fully 
prevent. One of the reasons is the lack of thoroughly studies of 
the market abuse strategies and the corresponding effective 
market abuse approaches. In this paper, the strategies of 
reported price manipulation cases are analysed as well as the 
related empirical studies. A transformation is then defined to 
convert the time-varying financial trading data into pseudo-
stationary time series, where machine learning algorithms can be 
easily applied to the detection of the price manipulation. The 
evaluation experiments conducted on four stocks from NASDAQ 
show a promising improved performance for effectively detecting 
such manipulation cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance of the financial exchange market for 
monitoring market abuse activities has attracted much attention 
from financial regulators across different exchange markets in 
recent years especially since the flash crash in 2010. However, 
the lack of research in effective and efficient detection 
algorithms, in both industry and academia, causes challenges 
for regulators in their ability to monitor huge amounts of 
trading activities in real-time. A major concern to financial 
market abuse is price manipulation, where the manipulated 
target is the bid (or ask) price of certain financial instruments 
[1]. There is a large amount of literature regarding stock 
market manipulation theories [1] [2] [3] and a few empirical 
studies of real manipulation cases [4]. However, an effective 
detection model of price manipulation is yet to be developed 
due to the lack of understanding of strategic spoofing tactics. 
In this paper, we summarize and further analyse the price 
manipulation strategies by examining actual reported cases as 
well as the empirical studies in existing literature. We define 
two key characteristics of price manipulation strategies, which 
enable us to propose a transformation procedure, converting 
the original market trading data to a comparable metric, where 
the non-stationary nature of the financial data is demonstrated 
to be “nearly removed” and the machine learning techniques 
can then be effectively applied as detection models. Our 
proposed detection approach is evaluated based on real trading 
records of selected stocks from NASDAQ. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II provides a brief review of price manipulation and the 
corresponding detection methods. In Section III, the price 
manipulation tactics are thoroughly analysed. A data transform 
procedure is then proposed and illustrated with real trading 
data. Section IV evaluates the proposed machine learning 
based detection models and the obtained promising 
performance is reported. Finally Section V concludes the paper 
and discusses potential improvements and future work. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Theoretical studies of the stock price manipulation were 
presented in a number of existing works. A model of 
transaction-based manipulation was developed, showing that 
price manipulation is profitable [1]. An “equilibrium model” 
was derived and proved that the existence of noise traders 
made it possible to manipulate the price, although theoretically, 
no profit should be expected according to the efficient market 
hypothesis [3]. A real price manipulation case conducted by 
large traders was examined and analysed in [5]. The real case 
proved that the manipulation tactic can make a risk-free profit, 
as a result of the significantly changing order flow. More 
empirical studies showed the increase of the volatility, 
liquidity, and returns of the underlying stock and an “up then 
down” process of the price during the manipulation period [1] 
[6] [2]. A comprehensive empirical study of the price 
manipulation strategy as well as the corresponding intention 
was carried out on real manipulation cases from Korea 
Exchange (KRX) [4]. One type of price manipulation strategy 
was formally defined according to its statistical features from 
the empirical study of the data from KRX; however, the 
thorough study did not lead to the design of a detection model. 
Research regarding the detection of the stock price 
manipulation is comparably limited in both academia and the 
financial industry. The appropriateness of a sample entropy 
methodology as a measure for the detection was evaluated in 
[7]; however, the statistical results did not favour the properties 
of sample entropy as an indicator of price manipulation. 
Logistic regression with an artificial neural network and 
support vector machine has been studied and compared as a 
method of detecting trade based manipulation within the 
emerging Istanbul Stock Market [8]. The detection model was 
built based on the assumption of higher deviations of the 
statistical features of daily return, volume and volatilities from 
normal cases indicating manipulation. Similar work has been 
carried out by firstly studying the reported manipulated cases 
and constructing a dataset of manipulated cases, and then 
modelling the returns, liquidity and volatility as well as the 
news and events related to the stocks during the manipulation 
period by linear and logistic regression [9]. Evaluations and 
comparisons of different techniques were also presented in [8] 
and [9], yet both works lack a reliable, reasonable analysis of 
the link between the abnormalities of the stock features and the 
disclosure of price manipulation. Therefore, this leaves a 
knowledge gap between the data attribute deviations and the 
detection techniques. An Inverse Reinforcement Learning 
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(IRL) algorithm was applied to the learning and classifying of 
traders’ behaviours. The experiments were conducted on a 
simulated S&P 500 futures market through a multi-agent 
approach [10] and achieved more than 90% classification 
accuracy. An empirical study of the relationship between the 
market efficiency and the market close price manipulation, 
defined as ramping, was carried out and showed a raise in 
execution costs of completing large trades when experiencing 
the market close ramping [11]. Ramping alert records 
generated by the detection algorithm from Smart Group 
International, a surveillance system provider, were analysed as 
a benchmark for this study. The algorithm detected market 
close ramping according to critical price changes where the 
threshold was set as the 99% histogram distribution cut-off of 
the historical price change during the benchmark period. A 
market close ramping alert was triggered if the changes of the 
closing price and price 15 minutes prior were greater than the 
chosen threshold [11]. 
To date, existing research has mainly focused on either 
empirical studies of certain price manipulation cases or the 
detection techniques based on abnormalities of the market 
features during the manipulation period. An effective 
classification algorithm was shown in [10] but it was based 
only on simulated markets where the traders and their 
strategies were clearly defined. 
In this paper, the manipulative strategies are analysed with 
no assumptions on unusual changes of market features. The 
proposed detection approaches are aimed at learning and 
modelling the trading behaviours and further identifying the 
manipulative actions by the learned model. Our approach is 
evaluated in a real data context. 
III. CHARACTERISING PRICE MANIPULATION 
Price manipulation activities affect price fluctuation in 
capital markets, where the returns, volatilities and liquidities, 
unexpectedly rise then decline during the manipulation period 
[1] [6] [2]. However, the occurrence of manipulation is hard to 
prove given the observed changes of the market attributes, 
which in most cases are the result of economic cycles, market 
(index) moves and even public events. The detection models 
based on the significant deviation of the market attributes are 
doomed to suffer from the error rate of the unusual but 
legitimate activities that are recognised as manipulation [7] [8] 
[9]. Instead of using the discrepancies of the financial market 
attributes, the manipulation strategic behaviour intrinsically 
offers a more accurate measure. Nevertheless, a model that is 
capable of directly monitoring behaviours is not available due 
to the lack of accurate definitions of manipulative behaviours. 
This is one of the major challenges faced when attempting to 
detect price manipulation. Recognise  
A. Price manipulation strategy characteristics 
A generic price manipulation tactic is defined as artificially 
pushing up (or down) the bid (or ask) price of a security and 
taking advantage of the shifted price so as to make a profit 
[12]. The deliberately constructed trading order sequences 
change the market bid (or ask) price and show the trader’s 
manipulative intentions. The characteristics of those orders 
define the manipulation strategy, which is the target of the 
detection model. The strategy is not constructed as incidentally 
heuristic attempts of placing orders but as careful designs of 
every single attribute of the placed orders according to the 
market impact theory [13], which suggests that the market 
effects are correlated with the quotes and sizes of the posted 
orders. A quantitative estimation of this effect given by a 
Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) [13] showed that either 
the larger size or the higher (or lower) quote (compared with 
the current bid (or ask)) induces stronger price impact on the 
market. For normal traders, measuring and eliminating the 
market impact is crucial; however, for the market 
manipulators, the market impact is simply utilized by them in 
strategies to make an economical profit. According to this, the 
price manipulation orders ought to be large-sized and of a 
higher (or lower) price than the bid (or ask) to maximize the 
market impact. However, none of the reported price 
manipulation will be completely conducted when following 
such format [13] due to another constraint: the placed orders 
for spoofing the market are expected to have little chance of 
being executed [4], (Execution refers to a failed manipulative 
action that is not accepted by the manipulators). Consequently, 
we argue that a price manipulative strategy is deemed to be 
fulfilling of two conditions: (1) maximising the induced price 
change; (2) minimising the execution risk. 
The definition of the primary manipulation tactic, spoofing 
trading, summarized from the real manipulation cases, is given 
as: an order with a size at least twice the previous day’s 
average order size, with a price at least 6 basis points (bps) 1 
away from the current bid (or ask) price and with a cancellation 
time longer than 30 minutes [4]. Those numerical definitions, 
“6 bps”, “2 times” and “30 minutes”, show a typical case of 
our argument: maximizing the induced price change (impact) 
by large size (at least twice the previous day’s average size) 
order staying at order book for a relatively longer time (30 
minutes) and minimizing the risk by passive quotes (6 bps 
away from the bid (or ask)) [4]. 
In September 2012, a price manipulation case was reported 
and documented by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority of the USA [14]. In this case, a sequence of spoofing 
buy orders was placed inside the spread, pushing up the bid 
price by 6.9 bps. After the manipulators had benefited from the 
transaction on their previous sell order at a higher price, the 
spoofing orders were cancelled. The complete manipulation 
process lasted for only 819ms and is known as quote stuffing. 
Another 17 analogous quote stuffing cases from 2011 - 2012 
were then reported by Nanex [15]. The average time duration 
and the induced bid (or ask) changes of the cases were 
calculated as 6.2 seconds and 627 bps respectively. Obviously, 
the numerical features, 6.9 bps and 819ms, of quote stuffing 
also conform to our argument: the aggressive quotes 
maximising the fictitious wild price changes and the 
instantaneous market sweeping minimising the execution risk. 
Spoofing trading and quote stuffing suggest two primary 
strategies of price manipulation. The former utilises a large 
volume and a passive quote for inducing the impact and 
reducing the risk while an aggressive quote and a tiny 
cancellation time are used in the latter, respectively. Both 
                                                          
1 A basis point is a unit equal to one hundredth of a percentage point 
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formats can be depicted by two key conditions defined in our 
argument. 
The two strategies are graphically illustrated in Fig. 1, 
where a three-level order book is initiated at the best bid, ݌௧௕,ଵ, 
and best ask, ݌௧௔,ଵ and the dotted lines represent a quick sweep 
of the market (tiny cancellation time). 
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Fig. 1  Spoofing trading and quote stuffing strategies in a three-level order 
book. 
B. Market Data Transformation 
Financial data is usually considered as a non-stationary 
time series [16]. From the detection model’s perspective, the 
non-stationarity increases the difficulty of identifying the 
manipulation through the utilisation of one uniform model. 
One method that would compensate this is that proposed in 
[17], which adaptively updates the model by monitoring any 
deviations in the data. However, frequent updates increase the 
computational complexity of the model. 
Here, we propose to transform the original data to a 
stationary domain while maintaining the desired features, 
which may bring an alternative computationally efficient 
solution. This idea is also reflected in a time series analysis, 
such as the autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) model which is usually applied in cases where the 
non-stationary feature of the data can be removed by an initial 
differencing step [18]. The log-return is also considered to be a 
transformation from market data to price difference, which is 
not believed to be perfectly time invariant [19] [20] but has 
also been analysed and concluded as stationary in a recent 
investigation [21]. 
Inspired by the differencing step and log-return methods, 
we define a transformation procedure as converting the order 
data to a consistent and comparable metric. On one hand, this 
procedure transforms the original data to pseudo-stationary; on 
the other hand, it enables the evaluation of analytic 
relationships amongst stocks despite the original unequal 
values of the order series. 
Denoting ݅  as a time index, indicating all order book 
activities, i.e., submission, cancellation and execution, a buy 
(or sell) order ݋௜௕ (or ݋௜௦) is described as a three dimensional 
vector, ቂ݌௢೔್ , ݒ௢೔್ , ݐ௢೔್ ቃ
ᇱ
 (or ቂ݌௢೔ೞ, ݒ௢೔ೞ, ݐ௢೔ೞ ቃ
ᇱ
), where p, v and t 
represent order price, volume and submission time (physical 
time) respectively. Furthermore, ݌௜௕ and ݌௜௔ denote the best bid 
and ask price instantaneously before the ݅௧௛ order activity. ߬ is 
denoted as the length of a sliding window and is set to one 
trading day, corresponding with the spoofing trading 
definition. Thus, ̅ݒఛ௕  and ̅ݒఛ௦ define the moving average volume 
of the buy and sell orders in the previous  ߬ period of time 
excluding the current data point ݅. The cancellation times and 
execution times of order  ݋௜௕  (or  ݋௜௦ ) are denoted by ݐ௢೔್
௖ and 
ݐ௢೔್
௘  (or ݐ௢೔ೞ
௖  and ݐ௢೔ೞ
௘ ) and the lifecycle of an order ݈௢೔್/ೞ can then 
be defined as 
 ݈௢೔್/ೞ
௖ = ݐ௢೔್/ೞ − ݐ௢೔್/ೞ
௖  (1) 
 ݈௢೔್/ೞ
௘ = ݐ௢೔್/ೞ − ݐ௢೔್/ೞ
௘  (2) 
for the cancelled or executed order respectively. Thus the 
average lifecycle of orders in the prior ߬ period are calculated 
as 
  ݈ఛ̅,௕/௦௖ =
1
ܰ ෍ ݈௢೔್/ೞ
௖
ே
௜ୀଵ
 (3) 
 
 ݈ఛ̅,௕/௦௘ =
1
ܰ ෍ ݈௢೔್/ೞ
௘
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
(4) 
The transformation is then defined in Equations (5), (6) and 
(7), where ݌௢೔೙, ݒ௢೔೙, ݐ௢೔೙  represent three transformed attributes. 
 ݌௢೔௡ =
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧ln ቆ
݌௢೔್
݌௜௕
 ቇ
ln ቆ݌௢೔
ೞ
݌௜௔
 ቇ
 (5) 
 
ݒ௢೔௡ =
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧ln ቆ
ݒ௢೔್
̅ݒఛ௕  ቇ
ln ൬ݒ௢೔
ೞ
̅ݒఛ௦  ൰
 (6) 
 
ݐ௢೔௡ =
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧ln ൭
݈௢೔್
௖
݈ఛ̅,௕௖
  ൱  ݋ݎ ln ൭
݈௢೔್
௘
݈ఛ̅,௕௘
  ൱
ln ൭
݈௢೔ೞ
௖
݈ఛ̅,௦௖   ൱  ݋ݎ ln ൭
݈௢೔ೞ
௘
݈ఛ̅,௦௘   ൱
 (7) 
The stationary nature of a time series (ܺ௧, ܺ௦)  is usually 
tested by the weak definition of stationarity [22] [23] meaning 
that the mean and variance of  (ܺ௧, ܺ௦) do not depend on t, 
while the autocorrelation (AutoCor) between (ܺ௧, ܺ௦)  and (ܺ௧ା୼௧, ܺ௦ା୼௧) depends only on the lag.  
To evaluate the stationarity, we calculate the mean, 
variance and AutoCor for the original and transformed data of 
the trading orders. In the calculation, we consider each order 
attribute as a single time series thus the original and the 
transformed data are represented as three time series 
respectively: 
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 ࡼ = ൜݌௢೔್/ೞൠ, ࢂ = ൜ݒ௢೔್/ೞൠ, ࢀ = ൜ݐ௢೔್/ೞൠ; 
 
 ࡼ࢔ = ቄ݌௢೔೙ቅ, ࢂ࢔ = ቄݒ௢೔೙ቅ, ࢀ࢔ = ቄݐ௢೔೙ቅ.  
The top four stocks in NASDAQ in terms of the total 
market capital, Apple, Google, Intel and Microsoft, are 
selected for evaluation. The datasets, obtained from LOBSTER 
project [24], cover messages over five trading days, from the 
11th to the 15th of June, 2012 and consist of more than 40,000 
trading orders in total for each stock. We calculated the mean 
and variance of the time series (X୲ା୼୲, Xୱା୼୲) with Δt from 0 to 
the length of the time series. The autocorrelation, AutoCor, is 
calculated between the time 
series (X୲, Xୱ) and (X୲ା୼୲, Xୱା୼୲) with the same Δt values.  
The calculated mean and variance of three attributes, price, 
volume and time, for the Intel dataset are shown as an example 
in Fig. 2. It should be noted that only the first 200 lag values 
are illustrated in the figures for a clear comparison between the 
original and transformed data. As shown in Fig. 2(g)-(l), the 
transformed price, volume and time all fluctuate around a 
nearly constant mean value with an approximately constant 
variance, while the attributes of original data Fig. 2(a)-(f) move 
with volatility across the time. 
When further observing the dispersion of the sequences of 
calculated mean and variance, the measure of the dispersion of 
a given sequence, the coefficient of variation (CV), defined as 
the ratio of standard deviation to the mean of a data sequence, 
is further calculated. The CV of the mean and variance 
sequences under different lag values for three attributes, price, 
volume and time are calculated for both the original data and 
the transformed data across four datasets and shown in Table I. 
The significantly smaller CV values of the mean and 
variance sequences of the transformed price, volume and time 
compared with the original data show far lower level of 
dispersion in the transformed data sequences, which indicates 
“nearly constant” mean and variance values. The “nearly 
constant” mean and variance partially conform to the weak 
definition of stationarity. 
Table I COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF THE SEQUENCE OF MEAN & VARIANCE 
OF THE PRICE, VOLUME AND TIME FOR THE DATASET OF FOUR STOCKS 
Trans.  
Data 
Coefficient of variation 
MSFT INTC GOOG APPA 
P Mean -1.08E-04 -3.73E-06 -2.63E-05 1.19E-04 Var. 1.31E-10 6.76E-11 6.59E-10 4.71E-10 
V Mean -1.11E-06 -9.51E-07 -1.33E-06 -1.31E-06 Var. 1.68E-10 1.08E-10 1.83E-10 1.64E-10 
T Mean 3.38E-06 3.70E-06 3.26E-06 3.34E-06 Var. 2.37E-09 4.63E-09 1.76E-09 1.00E-08 
Origin. 
Data 
Coefficient of variation 
MSFT INTC GOOG APPA 
P Mean 3.31E-01 8.73E-02 1.20E-02 1.01E-01 Var. 2.02E-01 2.05E-01 3.66E-01 2.16E-01 
V Mean 4.26E-02 1.17E-01 5.74E-02 1.59E-02 Var. 1.88E-01 2.08E-01 9.44E-02 1.40E-01 
T Mean 2.25E-01 7.75E-02 8.74E-01 5.14E-01 Var. 2.08E-01 1.92E-01 1.66E-01 1.83E-01 
 
As a time series matches up perfectly with itself (‘zero-
lag’), the figures in Fig. 3 begin from Δt = 1 to avoid large 
value at  Δt = 0 . Fig. 3 clearly shows the autocorrelation, 
AutoCor, of three transformed time series  ࡼ࢔ , ࢂ࢔ and  ࢀ࢔ , 
decreasing with an increasing lag and tailing off to tiny values, 
which additionally suggests the decorrelation of the 
transformed time series. Meanwhile, AutoCor of the original 
data also declines with increasing lags. Although not given in 
this paper, the datasets of another three stocks (Google, Intel 
and Microsoft) show identical features as illustrated in both 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. 
                
           (a)                                                     (b) 
  
           (c)                                                     (d) 
  
           (e)                                                     (f) 
  
           (g)                                                     (h) 
  
           (i)                                                     (j) 
  
           (k)                                                     (l) 
Fig. 2  Mean & Variance of original and transformed Price, Volume and Time 
for Intel stock.  
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The comparison between these figures shows that the non-
stationary features of the original data are “nearly removed” by 
the transformation; pseudo-stationary data is then generated, 
compensating for the time-varying features. 
 
           (a)                                             (b) 
 
           (c)                                             (d) 
 
           (e)                                             (f) 
Fig. 3 AutoCor of original and transformed Price, Volume and Time for Intel 
stock. 
C. Strategic behaviour illustration 
Given the “non-stationarity” removing transformation and 
the characteristics of the manipulation strategy previously 
discussed, we illustrate the converted data by denoting the x, y 
and z-axis by transformed price p୭౪౤ , volume v୭౪౤ and time t୭౪౤ 
respectively. The trading orders are then represented in a new 
3-dimensional domain as shown in the example in Fig. 4(a). 
Similarly, the original orders are also illustrated in the domain 
where x, y and z-axis is represented by original price p୭౟ౘ/౩ , 
volume  v୭౟ౘ/౩  and time  t୭౟ౘ/౩  respectively in Fig. 4(b). The 
example is formed from the Apple stock dataset captured on 
the 10th July 2013 with both “normal” and real manipulation 
cases, which were reported by Nanex [25] later on the same 
day. 
Fig. 4 clearly shows that: (1) the price manipulation cases 
(shown as the crosses) deviate from the mass normal trading 
orders in the transformed domain in Fig. 4(a) while 
overlapping with the normal orders in the domain of the 
original data in Fig. 4(b); (2) the normal trading orders tend to 
be distributed along the three axes in the transformed domain 
in Fig. 4(a)  while the original data shows exotic (and time 
varying) distributions in Fig. 4(b). The reported manipulation 
cases in the Apple stock trading also follow the proposed 
arguments: maximising the manipulated effects by aggressive 
quotes and minimising the execution risks by a tiny 
cancellation time. 
Similarly, the normal orders data of other selected stocks 
shows a similar pattern to Fig. 4. In the transformed domain, 
the normal orders congest together as an agglomerative cluster 
occupying a certain space with analogous but different shapes 
due to the naturally distinct trading behaviours across financial 
instruments while the original data show the exotic shapes.  
Since the manipulation cases are apparently located apart 
from the cluster (as Fig. 4(a)), the boundaries of such clusters 
provide an effective decision threshold. However, such 
boundaries cannot be described by simply setting up thresholds 
on three attributes; this is due to the unknown convexity 
feature of the 3-dimensional spherical surface. Precisely 
describing the cluster shapes by only the normal data requires 
some sophistication. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 4  Normal and Manipulation cases illustration. (a) The transformed data; 
(b) The original data. 
IV. DETECTING PRICE MANIPULATION 
The concept of describing the shape of a cluster of 
normalities is often referred to as novelty detection, where the 
abnormalities are subsequently identified by testing for novelty 
against the model of the normality. The mass of normal trading 
data and the scarceness of the manipulation cases, due to the 
regulatory rules prohibiting the disclosure of illegitimate 
market cases, are another reason that the novelty detection 
paradigm suits the detection of such manipulation. 
K-Nearest Neighbour (kNN) based novelty detection is one 
of the simplest non-parameter methods. It simply computes the 
distances between the test data and all training samples and 
uses the lowest distance score plus a threshold (a radius around 
that example) to make the novelty decision. In general, the 
Euclidean distance is used between two samples [26].  
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One-class support vector machine (OCSVM) is another 
ideal approach for novelty detection, as it provides a direct 
description of the boundary of normality (the support vectors) 
[27] [28]. OCSVM applied to price manipulation detection 
provides a measure of unusualness in trading activity by 
learning a representation of normal orders. 
In this paper, we examine the price manipulation detection 
problem using the above-mentioned two machine learning 
models on the transformed time series as well as the original 
market data. We argue that both models work effectively on 
the underlying detection problem and the proposed 
transformation procedure significantly improves the detection 
performance. 
A. Application of OCSVM and kNN to price manipulation 
detection 
When applying the novelty detection approaches to the 
price manipulation detection problem, a set of normal data 
vectors ࡿ = {࢕ଵ, ࢕૛, … , ࢕࢚} is collected as the training dataset. 
The vector ࢕௧ is from either the vector of the original market 
data ൣ݌௢೔, ݒ௢೔, ݐ௢೔൧
ᇱ
 (݋௜: a buy or sell order), or the transformed 
data  ݌௢೔೙, ݒ௢೔೙, ݐ௢೔೙ , calculated by Equations (5)-(7). In the 
experimental evaluation, the OCSVM and kNN are applied to 
the four datasets Apple, Google, Intel and Microsoft   
discussed in Section III.B. The selection of these datasets is 
according to their relatively high trading volumes and more 
volatile price fluctuation, factors that may increase the 
likelihood of manipulation across the exchanges [4] [29]. Each 
dataset is divided into five subsets according to the trading 
date. One subset is chosen as the training dataset, where the 5-
fold cross-validation is used for training the models; the 
remaining four subsets are used in the testing. 
The evaluation of a detection model is usually reliant upon 
the labelled benchmarks of both normality and abnormality. 
Due to a few real manipulation cases being reported, we 
needed to synthesize a number of abnormal cases based on our 
study of the characteristics of the manipulation strategy. 
Synthetic exploratory financial data is accepted in academia for 
evaluating the proposed model when real market data is hard to 
collect [30] [31]. 
Two primary formats of price manipulation, spoofing 
trading and quote stuffing, are reproduced in the context of the 
datasets of each stock following the original characteristics 
discussed in Section III.A: 
x spoofing trading: orders with sizes of at least twice 
the previous day’s average order size, with prices of at 
least 6 basis points outside the current bid-ask spread 
and with a cancellation time of 30 minutes; 
x quote stuffing: orders with regular size, with quotes 
627 bps higher (or lower) than the current bid (or ask) 
price and with approximately 6.2 seconds of 
cancellation time. 
The generated manipulation cases are then randomly 
injected into the corresponding order records, creating a 
mixture of both “normal” and “abnormal” patterns in the 
testing datasets. In order to ensure comprehensive assessment 
of the approach, 5000 synthesized cases are injected to each 
dataset with each type containing 2500 examples. For the 
Apple stock dataset, the reported real cases are also injected for 
evaluation. 
In our experiments, LIBSVM [32] and DDTool [33], two 
open source libraries, are used as the implementation of the 
OCSVM and kNN respectively. The model parameters, namely 
the Gaussian kernel and the k value for kNN are determined by 
5-folder cross-validation for stable and optimised results. 
Performance evaluation is based on the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC), which is calculated according to the 
confusion matrix, where false positive (FP), is defined as 
manipulation cases detected as normal, false negative (FN) is 
defined as normal cases detected as manipulation, true positive 
(TP) is defined as normal cases detected as normal and true 
negative (TN) is defined as manipulation cases detected as 
manipulation. The ROC curve is a widely used metric for 
evaluating and comparing binary classifiers. The ROC curve 
plots the true positive rate ቀ ୘୔୘୔ା୊୒ቁ against the false positive 
rate ቀ ୊୔୊୔ା୘୒ቁ while the discrimination threshold of the binary 
classifier is varied. In order to assess the overall performance 
of a novelty detector, one can measure the area under the ROC 
curve (AUC). Larger AUC values are generally an indication 
of better classification performance. 
The ROC curves of two models on four stock datasets 
(original and transformed) with 5000 injected novelties in each 
dataset are illustrated in Fig. 5. The calculated AUC values are 
summarised in TABLE II. 
TABLE II AUC OF TWO MODELS ON FOUR STOCK DATASETS 
Model AUC Data Improvement Original Transformed 
OCSVM 
APPLE 0.866 0.963 11.201% 
GOOGLE 0.831 0.997 19.976% 
INTEL 0.906 0.958 5.751% 
MSFT 0.976 0.990 1.379% 
 AUC Data Improvement  Original Transformed 
kNN 
APPLE 0.884 0.928 5.057% 
GOOGLE 0.625 0.857 37.279% 
INTEL 0.854 0.866 1.433% 
MSFT 0. 926 0.964 4.117% 
 
It is clear that both detection models with the 
transformation procedure achieved a significantly better 
performance than with the original market data in terms of the 
AUC values in TABLE II, where the Improvement column is 
calculated by  ൫஺௎஼೟ೝೌ೙.ି஺௎஼೚ೝ೔೒೔೙൯஺௎஼೚ೝ೔೒೔೙  as the improvement 
percentage. On the transformed data, both models achieved 
high AUC on all four of the datasets. Even the smallest AUC 
value, 0.857 of kNN on the Google dataset, can also be 
considered as a good performance [34]. After checking the 
testing results of the Apple stock, the injected real 
manipulation cases are successfully discovered by both 
models. The good performance can be explained by the 
OCSVM and kNN models effectively modelling the 
boundaries of the normal behaviour clusters.  
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Meanwhile, as shown in Fig. 4(a), the transformed data 
show a relatively regular cluster shapes compared with the 
exotically distributed initial data in Fig. 4(b). We argue that the 
proposed transformation procedure particularly contributes to 
establishing the “pseudo stationary” regular cluster shapes. 
From the machine learning perspective, the proposed 
transformation procedure pre-processes the data and 
sufficiently extracts the required features. The data points in 
the feature domain can be easily and relatively effectively 
modelled by both kNN and OCSVM. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 5 ROC of two models on four stock datasets. 
 
As discussed before, to compensate the non-stationarity of 
the data, one approach is to adaptively updating the model by 
monitoring any deviations in the data distribution. The pseudo- 
stationarity feature of the transformed data will effectively 
reduce the necessary updates and consequently provides a 
computationally efficient approach. 
It is also noted that the OCSVM outperforms the kNN 
across all four different datasets. The higher performance of 
OCSVM may be due to a better description of the clusters of 
normal cases through a more accurate description of the 
boundary by support vectors. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper analysed the price manipulation in the financial 
market and defined its key features. A transformation 
procedure is proposed for mapping non-stationary market data 
to pseudo stationary attributes, to which the machine learning 
algorithms can easily be applied as a detection model. The 
evaluation, which has been conducted on top four stocks from 
NASDAQ in terms of the market capital, shows promising 
performance in terms of area under the ROC curve. 
In the proposed method, the stationary nature of the data is 
tested separately on three attributes, which however, have been 
modelled by OCSVM and kNN as a feature vector. The study 
of the stationarity of the order vector and the corresponding 
detection model updating (re-training) will be the focus of our 
future work. Furthermore, in recent years, the market 
manipulation tends to be carried out in more than one exchange 
market by some tricky manipulators. Detection within any 
single market hardly achieves a complete and accurate result. 
This requires a cross-market detection model, which is also one 
of our primary future works. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  F. Allen and D. Gale, “Stock-price manipulation,” Review of Financial 
Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 503-529, 1992.  
[2]  R. K. Aggarwal and G. Wu, “Stock Market Manipulations,” The Journal 
of Business, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 1915-1953, 2006.  
[3]  F. Allen and G. Gorton, “Stock Price Manipulation, Market 
Microstructure and Asymmetric Information,” European Economic 
Review, vol. 36, pp. 624-630, 1992.  
[4]  E. J. Lee, K. S. Eom and K. S. Park, “Microstructure-based 
manipulation: Strategic behavior and performance of spoofing traders,” 
Journal of Financial Markets, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 227–252, 2013.  
[5]  R. A. Jarrow, “Market manipulation, bubbles, corners, and short 
squeezes.,” Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 3, p. 27, 
1992.  
[6]  M. Jianping, G. Wu and C. Zhou, “Behavior based manipulation: theory 
and prosecution evidence.,” New York University, 2004. 
[7]  M. Slama and E. Strömma, “Trade-Based Stock Price Manipulation and 
Sample Entropy,” Stockholm School of Economics, 2008. 
[8]  H. Öğüt, M. M. Doğanay and R. Aktaş, “Detecting stock-price 
manipulation in an emerging market: The case of Turkey,” Expert 
Systems with Applications, vol. 36, no. 9, p. 11944–11949, 2009.  
[9]  D. Diaz, B. Theodoulidis and P. Sampaio, “Analysis of stock market 
manipulations using knowledge discovery techniques applied to intraday 
trade prices.,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 38, no. 10, pp. 
12757-12771., 2011.  
[10] S. Yang, M. Paddrik, R. Hayes, A. Todd, A. Kirilenko, P. Beling and W. 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
ROC curve of APPLE
 
 
Transformed Data OCSVM
Origin Data OCSVM
Transformed Data kNN
Origin Data kNN
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
ROC curve of GOOGLE
 
 
Transformed Data OCSVM
Origin Data OCSVM
Transformed Data kNN
Origin Data kNN
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
ROC curve of INTEL
 
 
Transformed Data OCSVM
Origin Data OCSVM
Transformed Data kNN
Origin Data kNN
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
ROC curve of MSFT
 
 
Transformed Data OCSVM
Origin Data OCSVM
Transformed Data kNN
Origin Data kNN
83
Scherer, “Behavior based learning in identifying High Frequency 
Trading strategies,” in IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence 
for Financial Engineering & Economics (CIFEr), New York, 2012.  
[11] M. Aitken, F. R. Harris and S. Ji, “Trade-based manipulation and market 
efficiency: a cross-market comparison,” in 22nd Australasian Finance 
and Banking Conference, 2009.  
[12] Y. Cao, Y. Li, S. Coleman, A. Belatreche and T.M.McGinnity, “A 
Hidden Markov Model with Abnormal States for Detecting Stock Price 
Manipulation,” in 2013 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics (SMC), Manchester, pp.3014-3019, Oct 2013.  
[13] N. Hautsch and R. Huang, “The market impact of a limit order,” Journal 
of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 501 - 522, 2012.  
[14] M. Ong and N. Condon, “FINRA Joins Exchanges and the SEC in 
Fining Hold Brothers More Than $5.9 Million for Manipulative Trading, 
Anti-Money Laundering, and Other Violations,” 25 September 2012. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2012/P178687. 
[15] NANEX, “Whac-A-Mole is Manipulation,” 25 September 2012. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/3598.html. 
[16] R. Ghazali, A. J. Hussain, N. M. Nawi and B. Mohamad, “Non-
stationary and stationary prediction of financial time series using 
dynamic ridge polynomial neural network,” Neurocomputing, vol. 72, 
no. 10-12, p. 2359–2367, 2009.  
[17] L. Cao, Y. Ou and P. Yu, “Coupled Behavior Analysis with 
Applications,” IEEE Transaction on Knowledge and Data Engeering, 
vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 1378-1392, 2012.  
[18] R. S. Tsay, Analysis of Financial Time Series, Wiley, 2010.  
[19] R. F. Engle, “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with 
Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation,” Econometrica, 
vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 987-1008, 1982.  
[20] T. Bollerslev, “Generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity,” Journal of Econometrics, vol. 31, no. 3, p. 307–327, 
1986.  
[21] C.-C. Lee, J.-D. Lee and C.-C. Lee, “Stock prices and the efficient 
market hypothesis: Evidence from a panel stationary test with structural 
breaks,” Japan and the World Economy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 49–58, 2010.  
[22] M. B. Priestley, Spectral Analysis and Time Series,, Academic Press, 
1982 .  
[23] S. Van Bellegem, “Adaptive methods for modelling, estimating and 
forecasting locally stationary processes,” Université catholique de 
Louvain, Louvain, 2003. 
[24] LOBSTER, “LOBSTER,” Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2013. 
[Online]. Available: https://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/index.php. 
[25] Nanex, “Incredible, Blatant Manipulation in Apple Stock,” 10 July 2013. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4352.html. 
[26] C. M. Bishop, Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning, Springer , 
2007 .  
[27] B. Schölkopf, J. C. Platt, J. Shawe-Taylor, A. J. Smola and R. C. 
Williamson., “Estimating the support of a high-dimensional 
distribution,” Neural computation, vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 1443-1471, 2001.  
[28] P. Hayton, S. Utete, D. King, S. King, P. Anuzis and L. Tarassenko., 
“Static and dynamic novelty detection methods for jet engine health 
monitoring,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: 
Mathematical,Physical and Engineering Sciences, vol. 365, no. 1851, pp. 
493-514, 2007.  
[29] D. J. Cumming, F. Zhan and M. J. Aitken, “High Frequency Trading and 
End-of-Day Manipulation,” Social Science Research Network, 2012. 
[30] G. K. Palshikar and M. M. Apte, “Collusion set detection using graph 
clustering,” Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 
135-164, 2008.  
[31] M. Franke, B. Hoser and J. Schröder, “On the Analysis of Irregular Stock 
Market Trading Behavior,” Studies in Classification, Data Analysis, and 
Knowledge Organization, pp. 355-362, 2008.  
[32] C.-C. Chang and C.-J. Lin, “LIBSVM: A library for support vector 
machines,” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, 
vol. 2, p. 27:1–27:27, 2011.  
[33] D. Tax, DDtools, the Data Description Toolbox for Matlab version 2.0.1, 
Delft University of Technology, 2013.  
[34] T. Fawcett, “An introduction to ROC analysis,” Pattern Recognition 
Letters, vol. 27, p. 74, 2006.  
 
 
84
